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Abstract
We reconsider the allocational invariance of equilibria to different formulations of market
completeness. We identify the so-far neglected assumption of sophisticated behavior as
crucial to this result. The paper studies three market structures. First, the Arrow-Debreu
setting is considered. Second, sequentially complete markets are analyzed, where goods on
the spot markets and all contingent one-period ahead commodities can be traded in every
state. Finally, complete markets are analyzed, where all possible contingent commodities
can be traded at every state. Preferences may be time-consistent or time-inconsistent. A
distinction is made between na¨ıve and sophisticated behavior. For economies with time-
inconsistent preferences, Arrow-Debreu equilibria are not related to either sequentially
complete equilibria or complete equilibria. It does hold that every equilibrium consump-
tion that can be attained in sequentially complete markets, can also be attained in complete
markets. An example shows that the converse is not true for na¨ıve economies. Finally,
when preferences are restricted to be time-consistent and households are sophisticated, the
three market structures yield the same equilibrium consumption. Surprisingly, for na¨ıve
households, this result is not true, even when preferences are time-consistent.
Keywords: Time-consistent preferences, Time-inconsistency, Competitive equilibrium, Mar-
ket completeness, Allocational equivalence
JEL classification: D51, D61, D91
1 Introduction
Debreu (1959) discusses how the one-period Arrow-Debreu (1954) model can be used to
analyze multi-period settings with uncertainty. The crucial idea is to include the period
and the state of the world at the time of delivery in the definition of a commodity, resulting
in contingent commodities. Debreu assumes that markets are complete in the sense that all
contingent commodities can be traded in the first period and does not allow for markets to
reopen after the first period. It is indeed widely believed that there is no need for markets
to reopen as time passes.
As an alternative to the assumption that all contingent commodities can be traded in
the initial period, sequentially complete markets have been considered. In a sequentially
complete market structure, it is typically assumed that at every state there are complete
spot markets for commodities available at that state together with a restricted set of
markets for commodities available at future states. It is well-known that, under certain as-
sumptions, equilibria in the Arrow-Debreu model are allocationally equivalent to equilibria
in sequentially complete models, see Arrow(1953). Donaldson and Selden (1981) and Haller
(1990) provide two discussions of the assumptions needed for this result. Dre`ze and Herings
(2003) show in an example that there might be equilibrium continuations in a sequentially
complete markets setting that are not allocationally equivalent to any equilibrium in the
Arrow-Debreu setting. A closer look at their example suggests that the result is driven by
the fact that in the Arrow-Debreu setting, markets are not reopened. Chattopadhyay and
Gottardi (1999) consider differences between complete and sequentially complete market
structures in overlapping generations models.
This paper studies multi-period economies subject to uncertainty, where markets may
reopen at future states. At every state, households are endowed with preferences that may
or may not be time-consistent. In general equilibrium models, time-inconsistent preferences
have been introduced by Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) and Herings and Rohde (2004). We
consider three market structures that are commonly believed to result in the same set
of competitive equilibria. First, we consider the Arrow-Debreu structure with complete
markets in the first period and no reopening of markets as time passes. Second, we consider
sequentially complete markets, where in every state, people can trade the goods to be
consumed in that state and all one-period ahead contingent commodities. Finally, we
consider the complete market structure. We say that markets are complete if, in every
state, there are complete markets for all contingent commodities to be consumed in that
state or in a later state.
We follow Pollak (1968) in making a distinction between na¨ıve and sophisticated be-
havior. Sophisticated households make plans that they expect to stick to in the future.
These households can be interpreted as consisting of multiple agents, playing a subgame
perfect equilibrium against themselves.
In general, the Arrow-Debreu market structure leads to equilibrium allocations that dif-
fer from equilibrium allocations corresponding to the other two market structures. The ex-
planation is that the Arrow-Debreu market structure yields the commitment power needed
not to re-trade. For sophisticated economies, sequentially complete markets yield the
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same allocations as complete markets do, even when preferences are allowed to be time-
inconsistent. The assumption of sophisticated behavior is extremely demanding. It might
be more reasonable to assume that households, at least partly, mispredict their future
preferences (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003)). For na¨ıve economies any se-
quentially complete equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some complete equilibrium,
but the converse statement does not hold.
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Figure 1: Na¨ıve equilibria when preferences are time-consistent.
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Figure 2: Sophisticated equilibria when preferences are time-consistent.
When preferences are time-consistent, we show that all three markets structures are
allocationally equivalent for sophisticated economies. For na¨ıve economies, every equilib-
rium in the Arrow-Debreu market structure is allocationally equivalent to some sequentially
complete equilibrium and some complete equilibrium, but surprisingly the reverse does not
hold. The results of this paper are summarized in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. In those figures an
arrow from ‘A’ to ‘B’ indicates that any concept ‘A’ equilibrium allocation is allocationally
equivalent to some concept ‘B’ equilibrium allocation.
This paper therefore identifies a crucial assumption that has to be satisfied in order for
complete and sequentially complete markets to be equivalent: behavior should be sophis-
ticated. For equivalence to Arrow-Debreu markets, it is also needed that preferences are
time-consistent.
Section 2 starts by describing the primitives of the economies as considered in this
paper, without elaborating on market structures. Section 3 describes the Arrow-Debreu
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Figure 3: Na¨ıve equilibria when preferences are time-inconsistent.
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Figure 4: Sophisticated equilibria when preferences are time-inconsistent.
market structure. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the sequentially complete markets structure
and the complete one, respectively. Both these sections are built up in the same fashion.
First, na¨ıve and sophisticated behavior is described. Then, properties of the specific market
structure are studied. Section 6 then concludes.
2 The Primitives of the Economy
There is a finite number of periods t ≤ T, where t, T ∈ N. In every period t ≥ 2, |Ω|
possible events can happen, where Ω denotes a finite set of events. A sequence of T events
constitutes a state. We denote S = ΩT−1. For every s ∈ S and every t ∈ T with t ≥ 2, we
define the state at period t by
s(t) =
{
(ωτ )
t
τ=2 ∈ Ω
t−1 | ∃ (ωτ )
T
τ=t+1 ∈ Ω
T−t with (ωτ )
T
τ=2 = s
}
.
For t = 1, we define s(1) = 1.
Figure 5 illustrates the structure of an economy with 4 periods (T = 4) and two events
in every period (Ω = {Bad, Good}). A state in period 4 is a path from the root of the tree
to an end-node. Thus, in the figure there are 8 states in period 4. Consider the state that
corresponds to the path that leads to the third end-node from above. We call this state
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Figure 5: An economy with T = 4 and Ω = {Bad, Good}
s3 = (B,G,B). We have s3(2) = B, s3(3) = (B,G), and s3(4) = (B,G,B). For every s(t)
we define s+(t) = {σ(t + 1) ∈ Ωt|σ ∈ S, σ(t) = s(t)}.
The economy consists of a finite number of households h ∈ H. In every state of every
period, households consume a finite number of goods l ∈ L. For s ∈ S and τ ≥ t, the
consumption bundle xhs(τ)|s(t) denotes the consumption of every good at state s(τ) antici-
pated in state s(t). Consumption for state s(t) and every later state anticipated at s(t), is
given by the consumption plan xh·|s(t). The notation x
h
·|s(t) ≀xˆ
h
·|s(τ), means x
h
·|s(t) with x
h
s(τ),T |s(t)
replaced by xˆh·|s(τ). For t ∈ T, we define Lt = L
∑T−t
τ=1 |Ω|
τ , the total number of commodi-
ties to be consumed at states later than s(t). Consumption in every state is limited to
the consumption sets Xh·|s(t) ⊂ R
L+Lt , where the interpretation of sub- and superscripts is
similar as before. A subscript l is added to denote consumption of good l. In every state
s(t), households have initial endowments eh·|s(t). Households are assumed to have correct
expectations about consumption sets and endowments.
In every state, households have preferences over consumption in that state and all
possible future states. Preferences of household h in state s(t) are represented by ºh,s(t),
a preference relation defined on Xh·|s(t). The complete set of preferences of household h is
denoted by ºh=
(
ºh,s(t)
)
s∈S,t∈T
.
Preferences might depend on the state of nature and can change over time. Consider
a consumption plan in state s(t). If we replace consumption from a future state σ(τ) on
by consumption that will be preferred once state σ(τ) is reached, then time-consistency
of preferences implies that the resulting consumption plan at state s(t) is preferred to the
original one.
Definition 2.1 Time-consistent Preferences
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Preferences for household h are time-consistent if for all periods t, τ with τ ≥ t and all
states s, σ ∈ S with σ(t) = s(t), for every xh·|s(t) ∈ X
h
·|s(t) and every x̂
h
·|σ(τ) ∈ X
h
·|σ(τ), we have
xh·|s(t) º
h,s(t) xh·|s(t) ≀ x̂
h
·|σ(τ)
if and only if
xhσ(τ),T |s(t) º
h,σ(τ) x̂h·|σ(τ).
Preferences are time-inconsistent if they are not time-consistent.
Preferences of a household in a particular state s(t) are locally non-satiated in state s(t′),
where t′ ≥ t, if for every consumption plan in state s(t), we can find another consumption
plan in state s(t) that (i) only deviates from the initial consumption plan in state s(t′),
(ii) is sufficiently close to the initial consumption plan, and (iii) is preferred to the initial
consumption plan. This can be formalized as follows. Consider a household h, a state s,
and two periods t, t′ with t′ ≥ t. Preferences ºh,s(t) are locally non-satiated in s(t′) if for
every xh·|s(t) ∈ X
h
·|s(t), for every ε > 0, there is an x
h
·|s(t) ∈ X
h
·|s(t) with x
h
σ(τ)|s(t) = x
h
σ(τ)|s(t)
for every σ(τ) 6= s(t′), ‖ xh·|s(t) − x
h
·|s(t) ‖< ε and x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t). An economy with
preferences
(
ºh,s(t)
)
h∈H,s∈S,t∈T
is locally non-satiated if for every state s and every t, t′ with
t′ ≥ t there is a household h such that ºh,s(t) is locally non-satiated in s(t′).
An economy E is described by its primitives (Xh·|1, e
h
·|1,º
h)h∈H . A household will sell its
endowments and use the revenues from this sale to buy goods he desires most. The timing
of the opportunities to sell endowments will depend on the market structure.
3 Arrow-Debreu Markets
This section considers the model of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959). There
are complete markets in contingent commodities in period 1. Markets do not reopen in
later periods. All commodities can be traded in period 1 against the prices p·|1. Prices for
commodities in state s(t) are then given by ps(t)|1. Prices for state s(t) and all states that
can be reached from s(t) are denoted by ps(t),T |1. We denote the set of possible prices by
P·|1 = R
L+L1 .
In the Arrow-Debreu model, markets do not reopen after period 1. Therefore, it is
implicitly assumed that consumption in those later periods is completely determined by
consumption in period 1. Moreover, since markets do not reopen after period 1, there is no
need to specify prices in periods after period 1. To be consistent in notation throughout
this paper, we do want to specify prices in periods after period 1. Without loss of generality,
we set prices in states later than period 1 equal to the prices in period 1 of corresponding
contingent commodities. We define p·|s(t) = ps(t),T |1 for every s(t), and P·|s(t) = R
L+Lt and
P =
∏
s(t) P·|s(t).
The opportunity set of household h in period 1 is given by
γ˘h1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1) = {x
h
·|1 ∈ X
h
·|1 | p·|1x
h
·|1 ≤ p·|1e
h
·|1}.
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The opportunity set of household h in any state s(t) with t > 1 is given by
γ˘hs(t)(p·|s(t), x
h
s(t),T |s(t−1)) = {x
h
s(t),T |s(t−1)}.
A household selects a most preferred consumption plan in the opportunity set. Thus, the
demand sets are given by
δ˘hs(t)(p·|s(t), x
h
s(t),T |s(t−1)) = {x
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
s(t)(p·|s(t), x
h
s(t),T |s(t−1)) |
∄ xh·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
s(t)(p·|s(t), x
h
s(t),T |s(t−1)) with x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t)}.
In equilibrium, total demand must equal total endowments. For notational purposes,
we define x∗h1,T |s(0) = e
h
·|1.
Definition 3.1 Arrow-Debreu (AD) Equilibrium
A pair (p∗, x∗) ∈ P ×X is an Arrow-Debreu (AD) equilibrium of the economy E if
(a) x∗h·|s(t) ∈ δ˘
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), x
∗h
s(t),T |s(t−1)) for all h ∈ H, t ∈ T , s ∈ S,
(b)
∑
h∈H x
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(c) p∗·|s(t) = p
∗
s(t),T |1 for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S.
4 Sequentially Complete Markets
This section considers sequentially complete markets. In every state there are spot markets
and forward markets for one-period ahead contingent commodities. In period t households
can trade all goods for period t and all goods for all possible events in period t + 1.
They have to form expectations about prices for goods that will be consumed in later
periods, i.e. periods from t + 2 on. We assume that they form point expectations and
that all households form the same expectations. We let P·|s(t) = R
L+Lt , Q·|s(t) = R
Lt ,
P =
∏
s(t) P·|s(t) and Q =
∏
s(t) Q·|s(t) Prices and expected (at state s(t)) prices on spot
markets will be denoted by p·|s(t) ∈ P·|s(t). Prices and expected (at state s(t)) prices of
forward commodities will be denoted by q·|s(t) ∈ Q·|s(t). The (expected) prices in state
s(t) of commodities to be delivered in state s(τ) and traded in s(τ − 1), are denoted by
qs(τ)|s(t). We define Y
h
·|s(t) = R
Lt and Y =
∏
h∈H
∏
s(t) Y
h
·|s(t). For household h the forward
commodity bundle for state s(τ) that is expected (in state s(t)) to be bought in state
s(τ − 1) is denoted by yhs(τ)|s(t). For notational purposes, we define y
h
·|s(0) = e
h
·|1.
When markets can reopen in the future, and preferences are allowed to be time-
inconsistent, a conflict can arise between the preferences from the perspective of one state
and those of another, later, state. Following Pollak (1968), we make a distinction between
na¨ıve and sophisticated households. Na¨ıve households will typically revise their plans over
time. Sophisticated households only make choices that they expect to stick to in the future.
The latter have the additional constraint that their expected future consumption should
be in their future demand sets given expected future prices. First, we consider na¨ıve and
then sophisticated behavior.
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4.1 Na¨ıve Behavior
In every state, na¨ıve households sell the endowments of that particular state and the one-
period ahead endowments. They use the revenue from selling these commodities to buy
goods on the spot markets and to buy one-period ahead contingent commodities. At each
state s(t) households form expectations about all future prices.
The opportunity set of household h in state s(t) is given by
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) =
{
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ X
h
·|s(t) × Y
h
·|s(t) |
pσ(τ)|s(t)x
h
σ(τ)|s(t) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
qσ(τ+1)|s(t)y
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t) ≤
pσ(τ)|s(t)y
h
σ(τ)|s(t) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
qσ(τ+1)|s(t)e
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t)
for every τ ≥ t, and every σ(τ) with σ(t) = s(t)
}
,
where, by definition, yhs(t)|s(t) = y
h
s(t)|s(t−1) and y
h
1|0 = e
h
1|0.
The demand set of household h in state s(t) is then given by
nδ
h
s(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) = {(x
h
·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) |
∄ (xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) with x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t)}.
Prices and consumption are said to constitute a na¨ıve sequentially complete equilibrium
if consumption is in the demand sets and if markets clear and are expected to clear in every
state.
Definition 4.1 Na¨ıve Sequentially Complete (SC) Equilibrium
A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ P ×Q×X × Y is a Na¨ıve Sequentially Complete (SC) equilibrium
of the economy E if
(a) (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈
nδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) for all h ∈ H, t ∈ T , s ∈ S,
(b)
∑
h∈H x
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S, and
(c)
∑
h∈H y
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t+1) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S.
4.2 Sophisticated Behavior
Sophisticated households only make plans that they expect to adhere to in the future.
They face the additional constraint that their expected future consumption should be in
their future demand sets given expected future prices.
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The opportunity set of sophisticated household h in state s(T ) is the same as for its
na¨ıve counterpart:
sγhs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
s(T )|s(T−1)) =
nγhs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
s(T )|s(T−1)).
The opportunity set of sophisticated household h in state s(t), where t < T, is given by
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) =
{
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ X
h
·|s(t) × Y
h
·|s(t) |
(i) pσ(τ)|s(t)x
h
σ(τ)|s(t) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
qσ(τ+1)|s(t)y
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t) ≤
pσ(τ)|s(t)y
h
σ(τ)|s(t) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
qσ(τ+1)|s(t)e
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t)
for every τ ≥ t, and every σ(τ) with σ(t) = s(t),
and
(ii)
(
xhs(t+1),T |s(t), y
h
s+(t+1),T |s(t)
)
∈
sδ
h
s(t+1)(ps(t+1),T |s(t), qs+(t+1),T |s(t), y
h
s(t+1)|s(t), e
h
t+2,T |s(t+1))
for every s(t + 1) ∈ s+(t)
}
.
The demand set of a sophisticated household is given by
sδ
h
s(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) = {(x
h
·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) |
∄ (xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) with x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t)}.
Prices, consumption bundles and purchases of forward commodities constitute a sophis-
ticated sequentially complete equilibrium if actual and planned supply of spot and forward
commodities equals demand, price expectations are correct, and expected consumption
and expected purchases of forward commodities equal realized consumption and realized
purchases of forward commodities. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 4.2 Sophisticated Sequentially Complete (SC) Equilibrium
A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ P × Q × X × Y is a Sophisticated Sequentially Complete (SC)
equilibrium of the economy E if
(a) (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈
sδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) for all h ∈ H, t ∈ T , s ∈ S,
(b)
∑
h∈H x
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(c)
∑
h∈H y
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t+1) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(d) p∗s(τ),T |s(t) = p
∗
·|s(τ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ ,
(e) q∗s(τ),T |s(t) = q
∗
s(τ),T |s(τ−1) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t < τ ,
(f) x∗hs(τ),T |s(t) = x
∗h
·|s(τ) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ, and
(g) y∗hs(τ),T |s(t) = y
∗h
s(τ),T |s(τ−1) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t < τ.
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4.3 Properties of Sequentially Complete Equilibria
In both na¨ıve SC and sophisticated SC equilibria, expectations of relative prices on spot
markets are equal to the corresponding expected relative prices of assets or one-period
ahead contingent commodities, except when all those asset prices are equal to zero. This is
formalized in the following lemma. Svensson (1976) derives a similar result in a two-period
economy without uncertainty. He called these expectations stationary point expectations.
Theorem 4.3 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a na¨ıve
SC equilibrium of E . Then for every s, σ ∈ S and every t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and σ(t) = s(t)
there is µσ(τ)|s(t) ∈ R such that
q∗σ(τ)|s(t) = µσ(τ)|s(t)p
∗
σ(τ)|s(t).
Proof
Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a na¨ıve SC equilibrium. Consider some s, σ ∈ S and τ, t ∈ T with τ >
t and σ(t) = s(t). Since the economy is locally non-satiated, it is evident that p∗σ(τ)|s(t) 6= 0.
Let l be a commodity such that p∗σ(τ),l|s(t) 6= 0.
Suppose there is l˜ ∈ L such that there is no µ ∈ R with both
µp∗σ(τ),l|s(t) = q
∗
σ(τ),l|s(t) and
µp∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
= q∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
.
Then it follows that
p∗σ(τ),l|s(t)q
∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
6= p∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
q∗σ(τ),l|s(t).
Let h be a household such that ºh,s(t) is locally non-satiated in σ(τ − 1).
Case 1: Assume that
p∗σ(τ),l|s(t)q
∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
> p∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
q∗σ(τ),l|s(t).
Now consider the vector ∆yh·|s(t) defined by
∆yhs′(t′),l′|s(t) =


p∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
if s′(t′) = σ(τ) and l′ = l,
−p∗σ(τ),l|s(t) if s
′(t′) = σ(τ) and l′ = l˜,
0 otherwise.
Then
p∗σ(τ)|s(t)∆y
h
σ(τ)|s(t) = 0,
i.e. in state s(t) household h could plan to buy ∆yh·|s(t) in addition to y
∗h
·|s(t), without
changing income in state σ(τ). Moreover,
q∗σ(τ)|s(t)∆y
h
σ(τ)|s(t) = q
∗
σ(τ),l|s(t)p
∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
− q∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
p∗σ(τ),l|s(t) < 0.
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Therefore, buying ∆yh·|s(t) in addition to y
∗h
·|s(t) decreases expected expenditures in state
σ(τ − 1), while not changing income in any other state.
By local non-satiation this contradicts (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) being a na¨ıve SC equilibrium.
Case 2: Assume that
p∗σ(τ),l|s(t)q
∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
< p∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
q∗σ(τ),l|s(t).
This case follows by repeating the argument of Case 1, replacing ∆yh·|s(t) by −∆y
h
·|s(t).
It follows that for any l˜ ∈ L, µ = q∗σ(τ),l|s(t)/p
∗
σ(τ),l|s(t) satisfies µp
∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
= q∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
.
Q.E.D.
The result of Theorem 4.3 is driven by the arbitrage opportunities that would be created
in locally non-satiated economies if the condition of the result would be violated. This
intuition is entirely correct for the na¨ıve case. The sophisticated case is more difficult. The
reason is that a sophisticated household cannot guarantee that his future self will behave
as he would like him to behave. Therefore, changing income in a future state may make
the future self consume a bundle that the current self does not like at all. The availability
of an arbitrage opportunity in a particular state is not sufficient to drive the result. The
arbitrage opportunity needs to be such that also income in future states is unchanged, so
that future selves will behave the same, irrespective of whether the arbitrage opportunity
is taken or not. Our proof for the na¨ıve case is constructed in such a way that these
properties are satisfied, and applies therefore to the sophisticated case as well.
Theorem 4.4 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophis-
ticated SC equilibrium of E . Then for every s, σ ∈ S and every t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and
σ(t) = s(t) there is a µσ(τ)|s(t) ∈ R such that
q∗σ(τ)|s(t) = µσ(τ)|s(t)p
∗
σ(τ)|s(t).
An AD equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to a na¨ıve (sophis-
ticated) SC equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a
na¨ıve (sophisticated) SC equilibrium. Similarly, a na¨ıve (sophisticated) SC equilibrium
(p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to an AD equilibrium if there is p ∈ P
such that (p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium.
When preferences are time-consistent one might expect that there is no difference be-
tween na¨ıve and sophisticated behavior. However, this is not the case. Na¨ıve SC equilibria
are not necessarily allocationally equivalent to AD equilibria. However, sophisticated SC
equilibria are allocationally equivalent to AD equilibria and the other way around. More-
over, every AD equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some SC equilibrium in both the
na¨ıve and the sophisticated case.
The following example, that shows that even for time-consistent preferences, there
are na¨ıve SC equilibria that are not allocationally equivalent to any AD equilibrium, is
borrowed from Dre`ze and Herings (2003).
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Example 4.5 Consider a two-period economy without uncertainty. There are two agents
and two goods in every period. Endowments are eh·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) for h = 1, 2. Preferences
are time-consistent and represented by
uh1(x
h
·|1) = v
h(xh1,1|1, x
h
1,2|1)
1
2 · vh(xh2,1|1, x
h
2,2|1)
1
2 ,
where
v1(x1·,1|1, x
1
·,2|1) =


[min(x1·,1|1, x
1
·,2|1)], min(x
1
·,1|1, x
1
·,2|1) ≤ 1,
[(x1·,1|1 − 1)
1
2 (x1·,2|1 − 1)
1
2 + 1], min(x1·,1|1, x
1
·,2|1) ≥ 1,
and
v2(x2·,1|1, x
2
·,2|1) =


[min(x2·,1|1, x
2
·,2|1)], min(x
2
·,1|1, x
2
·,2|1) ≤ 3,
[(x2·,1|1 − 3)
1
2 (x2·,2|1 − 3)
1
2 + 3], min(x2·,1|1, x
2
·,2|1) ≥ 3.
Now consider sequentially complete markets. Let p∗·|1 = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2), q
∗
2|1 =
(1/2, 1/2), p∗·|2 = (3/4, 1/4). Consider the following allocation
x∗1·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) x
∗2
·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2)
x∗1·|2 = (1, 1) x
∗2
·|2 = (3, 3)
achieved by the asset allocations
y∗12|1 = (0, 4),
y∗22|1 = (4, 0).
It can be verified that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a na¨ıve SC equilibrium. In particular it holds
that the choice of y∗12|1 = (0, 4) and y
∗2
2|1 = (4, 0) is optimal given prices and price expecta-
tions p∗·|1 = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2) and it holds that for the subeconomy starting in period 2
with initial endowments y∗12|1 = (0, 4) and y
∗2
2|1 = (4, 0), prices p
∗
·|2 = (3/4, 1/4) constitute a
competitive equilibrium. The prices for contingent commodities in period 1 are not pro-
portional to actual prices in period 2. Thus, households have incorrect expectations about
prices. Since x1·|1 = (2, 2, 1, 1) is not individually rational for household 1 from the perspec-
tive of period 1, there can be no p such that (p, (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 3, 3)) is an AD equilibrium.
2
When preferences are time-consistent, every AD equilibrium is allocationally equivalent
to some na¨ıve and to some sophisticated SC equilibrium. This is shown in the following
theorems.
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Theorem 4.6 Let preferences be time-consistent and let the economy E be locally non-
satiated. Let (p∗, x∗) be an AD equilibrium of E . Then there is (q∗, y∗) ∈ Q× Y such that
(p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a na¨ıve SC equilibrium of E .
Proof
Let (p∗, x∗) be an AD equilibrium. We define q∗·|s(t) = p
∗
t+1,T |s(t) for every s(t). By local
non-satiation of the economy we know that for every s, σ ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and
σ(t) = s(t) there is an lσ(τ)|s(t) with p
∗
σ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
6= 0. For every s(t), we define y∗h·|s(t)
recursively as follows. Start by setting, for every h ∈ H and every σ ∈ S with σ(t) = s(t),
y∗hσ(T ),lσ(T )|s(t)|s(t) =
p∗σ(T )|s(t)
(
x∗hσ(T )|s(t) − e
h
σ(T )|s(t)
)
p∗
σ(T ),lσ(T )|s(t)|s(t)
+ ehσ(T ),lσ(T )|s(t)|s(t),
and y∗hσ(T ),l|s(t) = e
h
σ(T ),l|s(t) for every l 6= lσ(T )|s(t). Then, continue by setting, for every h ∈ H,
t < τ < T, σ ∈ S with σ(t) = s(t),
y∗hσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t) =
p∗σ(τ)|s(t)
(
x∗hσ(τ)|s(t) − e
h
σ(τ)|s(t)
)
p∗
σ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
+ ehσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
+
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
(
p∗σ(τ+1)|s(t)y
∗h
σ(τ+1)|s(t) − p
∗
σ(τ+1)|s(t)e
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t)
)
p∗
σ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
and y∗hσ(τ),l|s(t) = e
h
σ(τ),l|s(t) for every l 6= lσ(τ)|s(t).
Then it holds that
p∗σ(T )|s(t)y
∗h
σ(T )|s(t) = p
∗
σ(T )|s(t)x
∗h
σ(T )|s(t)
for all s, σ, t, h, and
p∗σ(τ)|s(t)x
∗h
σ(τ)|s(t) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
p∗σ(τ+1)|s(t)y
∗h
σ(τ+1)|s(t) =
p∗σ(τ)|s(t)y
∗h
σ(τ)|s(t) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
p∗σ(τ+1)|s(t)e
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t).
for all s, σ, h, t ≤ τ < T.
We claim that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a na¨ıve sequentially complete equilibrium.
By summing the budget constraints over all households, using that∑
h∈H
x∗h·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H
eh·|s(t),
we obtain, for every s, t, ∑
h∈H
y∗h·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H
eh·|s(t+1).
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It therefore holds that conditions (b) and (c) of the definition of a na¨ıve sequentially
complete equilibrium are satisfied. It only remains to be checked that condition (a) is
satisfied as well.
Consider any t, s, h, and any (xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
By summing up budget constraints, we have that
p∗·|s(t)x
h
·|s(t) + p
∗
t+1,T |s(t)y
h
t+1,T |s(t) ≤
p∗s(t)|s(t)y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1) + p
∗
t+1,T |s(t)e
h
t+1,T |s(t) + p
∗
t+1,T |s(t)y
h
t+1,T |s(t),
so,
p∗·|s(t)x
h
·|s(t) ≤ p
∗
s(t)|s(t)y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1) + p
∗
t+1,T |s(t)e
h
t+1,T |s(t).
In addition, we have
p∗s(τ)|s(τ)x
∗h
s(τ)|s(τ) +
∑
s(τ+1)∈s+(τ)
p∗s(τ+1)|s(τ)y
∗h
s(τ+1)|s(τ) ≤
p∗s(τ)|s(τ)y
∗h
s(τ)|s(τ−1) +
∑
s(τ+1)∈s+(τ)
p∗s(τ+1)|s(τ)e
h
s(τ+1)|s(τ)
for every τ < t.
By summing all these and by keeping in mind that x∗ is a time-consistent allocation,
we find that x∗h·|1 ≀ x
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1).
Now suppose that there are t, s, h with
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈
nδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
Then there must be (xˆh·|s(t), yˆ
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) with xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t)
x∗h·|s(t). But then, by time-consistency of preferences x
∗h
·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,1 x∗h·|1. By the discussion
above we also have, x∗h·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1). So x
∗h
·|1 /∈ δ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1), a contradiction to the
fact that (p∗, x∗) is an AD equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.7 Let preferences be time-consistent and let the economy E be locally non-
satiated. Let (p∗, x∗) be an AD equilibrium of E . Then there is (q∗, y∗) ∈ Q× Y such that
(p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a sophisticated SC equilibrium of E .
Proof
Define q∗ and y∗ as in Theorem 4.6. We only need to verify whether condition (a) of
the definition of a sophisticated SC equilibrium is satisfied. By the same argument as in
Theorem 4.6 we know that for every s
x∗h·|s(T ) ∈
sδ
h
s(T )(p
∗
·|s(T ), y
∗h
s(T )|s(T−1)).
We continue the proof by an induction argument. Assume that, for some t,
(x∗h·|s(τ), y
∗h
·|s(τ)) ∈
sδ
h
s(τ)(p
∗
·|s(τ), q
∗
·|s(τ), y
∗h
s(τ)|s(τ−1), e
h
τ+1,T |s(τ))
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for every τ > t, for every s. Suppose that
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈
sδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
Then there must be (xˆh·|s(t), yˆ
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) with xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t)
x∗h·|s(t). The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.6 then leads to a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The following theorem shows that every sophisticated SC equilibrium is allocationally
equivalent to some AD equilibrium if preferences are time-consistent. Notice that we need
to make continuity assumptions for this direction.
Theorem 4.8 Let preferences be time-consistent and continuous, let consumption sets
be closed and bounded from below, and let the economy E be locally non-satiated. Let
(p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated SC equilibrium of E with p∗ ≫ 0. Then there is a p such
that (p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium of E .
Proof
Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated SC equilibrium. By Theorem 4.4, for every s, σ ∈ S
and every t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and σ(t) = s(t), there must be µσ(τ)|s(t) such that
q∗σ(τ)|s(t) = µσ(τ)|s(t)p
∗
σ(τ)|s(t).
Suppose that µσ(τ)|1 ≤ 0 for some σ(τ). Then q
∗
σ(τ)|1 = µσ(τ)|1p
∗
σ(τ)|1 ≤ 0. Thus, it would
be possible to increase available income in state σ(τ) without increasing expenditures in
state σ(τ −1). A household h that, from the perspective of period 1, is locally non-satiated
in state σ(τ), could change consumption in state σ(τ) and have a consumption plan that
is strictly preferred to the current bundle. Since preferences are time-consistent, the new
bundle would also be consistent with sophisticated behavior. This yields a contradiction
against x∗ being an equilibrium allocation. It follows that µσ(τ)|1 > 0 for every σ(τ).
Let p1|1 = p
∗
1|1 and pσ(τ)|1 = p
∗
σ(τ)|1
∏τ
τ ′=2 µσ(τ ′)|1 for every σ ∈ S and every τ > 1. Also,
let p·|s(t) = ps(t),T |1 for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S. It holds that p ≫ 0 and therefore that γ˘
h
1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1)
is compact.
Suppose that (p, x∗) is not an AD equilibrium. Then there is s(t) with x∗h·|s(t) /∈
δ˘hs(t)(p·|s(t), x
∗h
s(t),T |s(t−1)). Since we have x
∗h
·|s(t) = x
∗h
s(t),T |s(t−1) for every t > 1, it should hold
that s(t) = 1. We know that x∗h·|1 ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1). So there is x
h
·|1 with x
h
·|1 ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1)
and xh·|1 ≻
h,1 x∗h·|1. Since º
h,1 is continuous and γ˘h1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1) is compact, there exists a
maximum on γ˘h1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1) with respect to º
h,1 . Without loss of generality, xh·|1 equals
that maximum. We define xh·|s(t) = x
h
s(t),T |1 for every s(t). By the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 4.6, there must be y with (xh·|1, y
h
·|1) ∈
nγh1(p·|1, p2,T |1, e
h
·|1) and
yhs(t+1),T |s(t) = y
h
s(t+1),T |1 for every s(t). Moreover, from the opportunity sets, it follows that
nγh1(p·|1, p2,T |1, e
h
·|1) =
nγh1(p
∗
·|1, q
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1).
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Then, by definition of xh·|1 and the fact that x
h
·|1 ≻
h,1 x∗h·|1, there is s(t) such that
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) /∈
sδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t))
for any choice of yh·|s(t). Two cases can be distinguished.
Case 1:
There exists yh·|s(t) with (x
h
·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)). Then there
must be (xˆh·|s(t), y˜
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) with xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t). By
time-consistency of preferences, it follows that xh·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,1 xh·|1. Also, it can be checked
that xh·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1). This contradicts the definition of x
h
·|1. Thus, case 1 is not
possible.
Case 2:
There does not exist yh·|s(t) with (x
h
·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)). Since
xh·|1 ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p·|1, e
h
·|1) and relative prices do not change over time and are correctly anticipated,
this can only happen if there is s(t′) with t′ > t and
(xh·|s(t′), y˜
h
·|s(t′)) /∈
sδ
h
s(t′)(p
∗
·|s(t′), q
∗
·|s(t′), y
h
s(t′)|s(t′−1), e
h
t′+1,T |s(t′))
for every y˜h·|s(t′).
Next, as before, for s(t′) we can distinguish two cases. We repeat this reasoning until
we end up at the last period. For the last period, we can no longer distinguish two cases.
In the last period, only case 1 can happen. This again leads to a contradiction by a similar
reasoning as before. Q.E.D.
In general, for the time-inconsistent case, there is no relation between AD equilibria
and na¨ıve or sophisticated SC equilibria. When preferences are time-inconsistent conflicts
arise between current and future preferences. A na¨ıve household will typically deviate
from planned consumption, since he does not anticipate a change in his future preferences.
Sophisticated households do anticipate future changes, and are therefore constrained by
their future behavior. On the contrary, the AD market setting ensures perfect commitment
in period 1, which is optimal from the perspective of the preferences of households in
period 1. Constraints coming from the behavior of future selves are thereby irrelevant.
5 Complete Markets
In this section there are complete markets for all contingent commodities at every event of
every period. Again, p·|s(t) denotes the expected (at state s(t)) prices on the spot markets.
In state s(t), the expected state σ(τ) prices for contingent commodities that are delivered
in state σ˜(τ˜) are given by q(σ˜(τ˜)|σ(τ))|s(t), where τ˜ > τ ≥ t, σ˜(τ) = σ(τ), and σ(t) = s(t).
The expectations in state s(t) of prices for all one-period ahead contingent commodities
that can possibly be traded from state σ(τ) on, are denoted by q(·|σ(τ),T )|s(t). We define
Q·|s(t) = R
∑
T−1
τ˜=t Lτ˜ . We let yh(σ(τ˜)|σ(τ))|s(t) denote bundles of contingent commodities that
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are expected at s(t) to be bought in σ(τ) and that are delivered in σ(τ˜). For notational
purposes, we define yh(·|s(0))|s(0) = e
h
·|1. We also define Y
h
·|s(t) = R
∑
T−1
τ˜=t Lτ˜ . Finally,
X =
∏
h∈H
∏
s(t) X
h
·|s(t), Y =
∏
h∈H
∏
s(t) Y
h
·|s(t), P =
∏
s(t) P·|s(t), Q =
∏
s(t) Q·|s(t).
5.1 Na¨ıve Behavior
In every state, households sell their endowments which are determined by previous pur-
chases of contingent commodities. With the revenues of these sales they buy goods on the
spot markets and contingent commodities on asset markets. The contingent commodities
bought determine the endowments at future states. In order to make a choice, a household
needs to have expectations about prices of goods and contingent commodities in the future
so as to know what to buy. The opportunity set of household h in state s(t) is given by
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) =
{
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ X
h
·|s(t) × Y
h
·|s(t) |
pσ(τ)|s(t)x
h
σ(τ)|s(t) + q(·|σ(τ))|s(t)y
h
(·|σ(τ))|s(t) ≤
pσ(τ)|s(t)y
h
(σ(τ)|σ(τ−1))|s(t) + q(·|σ(τ))|s(t)y
h
(σ+(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|s(t)
for every τ ≥ t, and every σ(τ) with σ(t) = s(t)
}
,
where, by definition, yh(·|0)|0 = e
h
·|1 and y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t) = y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1). The demand set is then
given by
nδhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) = {(x
h
·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) |
∄(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) with x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t)}.
In equilibrium all markets should clear and should be expected to clear.
Definition 5.1 Na¨ıve Complete Equilibrium
A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ P ×Q×X × Y is a Na¨ıve Complete equilibrium of the economy E
if
(a) (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈
nδhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) for all h ∈ H, t ∈ T , s ∈ S,
(b)
∑
h∈H x
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S, and
(c)
∑
h∈H y
∗h
(·|s(τ))|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
τ+1,T |s(τ) for all t, τ ∈ T, s ∈ S.
5.2 Sophisticated Behavior
In period T the opportunity set of a sophisticated household h in state s is the same as
the opportunity set for its na¨ıve counterpart, i.e.
sγhs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
·|s(T−1)) =
nγhs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
·|s(T−1)).
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The opportunity set of a sophisticated household h in state s(t), where t < T, is given by
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) =
{
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈ X
h
·|s(t) × Y
h
·|s(t) |
(i) pσ(τ)|s(t)x
h
σ(τ)|s(t) + q(·|σ(τ))|s(t)y
h
(·|σ(τ))|s(t) ≤
pσ(τ)|s(t)y
h
(σ(τ)|σ(τ−1))|s(t) + q(·|σ(τ))|s(t)y
h
(σ+(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|s(t)
for every τ ≥ t, and every σ(τ) with σ(t) = s(t),
and
(ii) (xhs(t+1),T |s(t), y
h
(·|s(t+1),T )|s(t)) ∈
sδhs(t+1)(ps(t+1),T |s(t), q(·|s(t+1),T )|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t))|s(t))
for every s(t + 1) ∈ s+(t)
}
.
The demand set of a sophisticated household is as follows.
sδhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) = {(x
h
·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) |
∄(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) with x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) xh·|s(t)}.
Finally, we define a sophisticated complete equilibrium as follows.
Definition 5.2 Sophisticated Complete Equilibrium
A pair (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ P × Q × X × Y is a Sophisticated Complete equilibrium of the
economy E if
(a) (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈
sδhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) for all h ∈ H, t ∈ T , s ∈ S,
(b)
∑
h∈H x
∗h
·|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
·|s(t) for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(c)
∑
h∈H y
∗h
(·|s(τ))|s(t) =
∑
h∈H e
h
τ+1,T |s(τ) for all t, τ ∈ T, s ∈ S,
(d) p∗s(τ),T |s(t) = p
∗
·|s(τ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ ,
(e) q∗(·|s(τ))|s(t) = q
∗
·|s(τ) for all s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ ,
(f) x∗hs(τ),T |s(t) = x
∗h
·|s(τ) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ, and
(g) y∗h(·|s(τ))|s(t) = y
∗h
·|s(τ) for all h ∈ H, s ∈ S, t, τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ .
5.3 Properties of Complete Equilibria
An AD equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to a na¨ıve (sophisticated)
complete equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a
na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium. Similarly, a na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete
equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to an AD equilibrium if
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there is a p ∈ P such that (p, x∗) is an AD equilibrium. A na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete
equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is said to be allocationally equivalent to a na¨ıve (sophisticated)
SC equilibrium if there are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a na¨ıve
(sophisticated) SC equilibrium. A na¨ıve (sophisticated) SC equilibrium (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is
said to be allocationally equivalent to a na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium if there
are p ∈ P, q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete
equilibrium.
In complete equilibria, relative prices are expected to remain unchanged. This is proven
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a na¨ıve
(sophisticated) complete equilibrium of E . Then for every s, σ and every t, τ with t < τ
there must be µσ(τ)|s(t) ∈ R with
q∗(σ(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|s(t) = µσ(τ)|s(t)(p
∗
σ(τ)|s(t), q
∗
(·|σ(τ))|s(t)).
Proof
Consider some s, σ ∈ S and t, τ ∈ T with τ > t and σ(t) = s(t). Since the economy is locally
non-satiated, it holds that p∗σ(τ)|s(t) 6= 0. Let l be a commodity such that p
∗
σ(τ),l|s(t) 6= 0.
Apart from the fact that we have more cases, the remainder of the proof is analogous
to the proof of Theorem 4.3. Suppose that there is no µ ∈ R with both
µp∗σ(τ),l|s(t) = q
∗
(σ(τ),l|σ(τ−1))|s(t),
µp∗
σ(τ),l˜|s(t)
= q∗
(σ(τ),l˜|σ(τ−1))|s(t)
or that there is no µ with both
µp∗σ(τ),l|s(t) = q
∗
(σ(τ),l|σ(τ−1))|s(t) and
µq∗
(σ˜(τ˜),l˜|σ(τ))|s(t)
= q∗
(σ˜(τ˜),l˜|σ(τ−1))|s(t)
.
Next a contradiction can be obtained and the proof can be finished in a similar way as in
the proof of Theorem 4.3. Q.E.D.
In general, when preferences are allowed to be time-inconsistent, there is no link between
na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete equilibria and AD equilibria. In AD equilibria, because of
the commitment power provided by the AD market structure, future selves of households
have no influence. In na¨ıve complete equilibria, future selves will typically deviate from the
plans of current selves. In sophisticated complete equilibria, current selves are constrained
by the optimizing behavior of future selves.
When preferences are time-consistent, every AD equilibrium is allocationally equivalent
to some na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete equilibrium. This is shown in the following two
theorems.
Theorem 5.4 Let preferences in the economy E be time-consistent and let (p∗, x∗) be
an AD equilibrium of E . Then (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a na¨ıve complete equilibrium of E , where
18
y∗h(σ(τ˜)|σ(τ))|s(t) = x
∗h
σ(τ˜)|s(t) for every h, σ, s, τ˜ > τ ≥ t and q
∗
(σ(τ˜)|σ(τ))|s(t) = p
∗
σ(τ˜)|s(t) for every
σ, s, τ˜ > τ ≥ t.
Proof
Let prices be as described in the theorem. First of all, we need one observation. Consider
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)).
Then we have
p∗σ(τ)|s(t)x
h
σ(τ)|s(t) + p
∗
σ+(τ),T |s(τ)y
h
(τ+1,T |σ(τ))|s(t) ≤ p
∗
σ(τ),T |s(t)y
h
(σ(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|s(t)
for every σ, τ ≥ t. By adding these over all σ(τ) with τ ≥ t and σ(t) = s(t), we get
p∗·|s(t)x
h
·|s(t) ≤ p
∗
·|s(t)y
h
(s(t),T |s(t−1))|s(t−1). (1)
Thus, we also have
p∗·|σ(t)x
∗h
·|σ(t) ≤ p
∗
·|σ(t)y
∗h
(σ(t−1),T |σ(t−1))|σ(t). (2)
for every σ. Similarly, for all τ < t, we know that
p∗s(τ)|s(τ)x
∗h
s(τ)|s(τ) + p
∗
τ+1,T |s(τ)y
∗h
(τ+1,T |s(τ))|s(τ) ≤ p
∗
·|s(τ)y
∗h
(s(τ),T |s(τ−1))|s(τ−1), (3)
by definition of y∗. Using that p∗s(τ),T |s(t) = p
∗
·|s(τ), and taking the sum of equation (2)
for all σ(t) 6= s(t), equation (1) and equation (3) for all s(τ) with τ < t, we obtain
x∗h·|1 ≀ x
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1).
With this observation in mind, we can continue the proof. Since (p∗, x∗) is an AD
equilibrium and by definition of y∗, it follows immediately that conditions (b) and (c)
of the definition of a na¨ıve complete equilibrium are satisfied. It remains to be shown
that condition (a) is satisfied as well. Suppose there are t, s(t), h with (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈
nδhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)). Then there must be
(xˆh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1))
with xˆh·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) x∗h·|s(t). But then, by time-consistency of preferences, x
∗h
·|1≀xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,1 x∗h·|1. By
our observation, it follows that x∗h·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1). So x
∗h
·|1 /∈ δ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1), contradicting
that (p∗, x∗) is an AD equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.5 Let preferences in the economy E be time-consistent and let (p∗, x∗) be an
AD equilibrium of E . Then (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a sophisticated complete equilibrium of E , where
y∗h(σ(τ˜)|σ(τ))|s(t) = x
∗h
σ(τ˜)|s(t) for every h, σ, s, τ˜ > τ ≥ t and q
∗
(σ(τ˜)|σ(τ))|s(t) = p
∗
σ(τ˜)|s(t) for every
σ, s, τ˜ > τ ≥ t.
Proof
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First, of all, by definition of p∗, q∗, x∗, and y∗, it follows immediately that conditions (b),
(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of the definition of a sophisticated complete equilibrium are
satisfied. It remains to be shown that condition (a) is satisfied as well.
By the same argument as used in the proof of Theorem 5.4, it holds that
(x∗h·|s(T ), y
∗h
·|s(T )) ∈
sδhs(T )(p
∗
·|s(T ), y
∗h
·|s(T−1)).
We proceed with an induction argument. Let s ∈ S, t ∈ T. Assume that
(x∗h·|s(t+1), y
∗h
·|s(t+1)) ∈
sδhs(t+1)(p
∗
·|s(t+1), q
∗
·|s(t+1), y
∗h
(·|s(t))|s(t))
for every s(t + 1) ∈ s+(t). Suppose that (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) /∈
sδhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)).
Then there must be (xˆh·|s(t), yˆ
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)) with xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t)
x∗h·|s(t). But then, by time-consistency of preferences x
∗h
·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,1 x∗h·|1. By the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.4 we also have x∗h·|1 ≀ xˆ
h
·|s(t) ∈ γ˘
h
1 (p
∗
·|1, e
h
·|1). This
contradicts (p∗, x∗) being an AD equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The following example shows that even when preferences are time-consistent, not every
na¨ıve complete equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to an AD equilibrium.
Example 5.6 Consider Example 4.5. For two-period economies, the sequentially complete
market structure is identical to the complete market structure. Thus, (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is also
a na¨ıve complete equilibrium. Again, there is no p such that (p, (2, 2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 3, 3)) is an
AD equilibrium. 2
Every sophisticated complete equilibrium, however, is allocationally equivalent to some
AD equilibrium when preferences are time-consistent. Again, we need to make continuity
assumptions.
Theorem 5.7 Let preferences be time-consistent and continuous, let consumption sets
be closed and bounded from below, and let the economy E be locally non-satiated. Let
(p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated complete equilibrium of E with p∗ ≫ 0. Then (p, x∗) is an
AD equilibrium of E , where p1|1 = p
∗
1|1 and p2,T |1 = q
∗
2,T |1|1.
Proof
This proof is analogous to the proof for the sophisticated SC equilibrium in Theorem 4.8.
Q.E.D.
So far we have studied the relation between AD equilibria and SC and complete equi-
libria, respectively. Now we will analyze the relation between the latter two. The next
theorem shows that every na¨ıve SC equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some na¨ıve
complete equilibrium. Notice that there is no need to assume time-consistency to obtain
this result.
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Theorem 5.8 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated and let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a na¨ıve
SC equilibrium of E . Then there is (p, q, y) ∈ P × Q × Y such that (p, q, x∗, y) is a na¨ıve
complete equilibrium of E .
Proof
Since (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a na¨ıve SC equilibrium, it holds that
(x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈
nδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
For s(t), σ(τ) with τ > t, we define µσ(τ)|s(t) as the unique real number satisfying q
∗
σ(τ)|s(t) =
µσ(τ)|s(t)p
∗
σ(τ)|s(t), see Theorem 4.3.
Next, we define ps(t)|s(t) = p
∗
s(t)|s(t), pσ(τ)|s(t) = p
∗
σ(τ)|s(t)
∏τ
τ ′=t+1 µσ(τ ′)|s(t), q(σ(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|s(t) =
pσ(τ),T |s(t). Let y
h
(σ(τ+1)|σ(τ))|s(t) = y
∗h
σ(τ+1)|s(t) and y
h
(σ(τ+2),T |σ(τ))|s(t) = e
h
·|σ(τ+2) for every τ ≥ t
and every σ with σ(t) = s(t). Then
(x∗h·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
Suppose that (x∗h·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) /∈
nδhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)). Then there must
be (xh·|s(t), y˜
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)) with x
h
·|s(t) ≻
h,s(t) x∗h·|s(t). As in the
proof of Theorem 4.6 it follows that there is ŷh·|s(t) with
(xh·|s(t), ŷ
h
·|s(t)) ∈
nγhs(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
This then contradicts the fact that (x∗h·|s(t), y
∗h
·|s(t)) ∈
nδ
h
s(t)(p
∗
·|s(t), q
∗
·|s(t), y
∗h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
Q.E.D.
Surprisingly, there are na¨ıve complete equilibria that are not allocationally equivalent
to any na¨ıve SC equilibrium. This is shown in the following example.
Example 5.9 Consider Example 4.5. We reinterpret the variables. There are four periods.
In every period there is only one good. There is no uncertainty. The endowments are
e1·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) for household 1 and e
2
·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) for household 2.
Now consider the complete market structure. Let p∗·|1 = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2), q
∗
(·|1)|1 =
(1/2, 1/2, 1/2), q∗(·|2)|1 = (1/2, 1/2), q
∗
(·|3)|1 = 1/2, p
∗
·|2 = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2), q
∗
(·|2)|2 = (1/2, 1/2),
q∗(·|3)|2 = 1/2, p
∗
·|3 = (3/4, 1/4), q
∗
(·|3)|3 = 1/4. Consider the following allocation
x∗1·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2) x
∗2
·|1 = (2, 2, 2, 2)
x∗1·|2 = (2, 2, 2) x
∗2
·|2 = (2, 2, 2)
x∗1·|3 = (1, 1) x
∗2
·|3 = (3, 3)
x∗1·|4 = 1 x
∗2
·|4 = 3
achieved by the asset allocations
y∗1(·|1)|1 = (2, 0, 4) y
∗2
(·|1)|1 = (2, 4, 0)
y∗1(·|2)|2 = (0, 4) y
∗2
(·|2)|2 = (4, 0)
y∗1(·|3)|3 = 1 y
∗2
(·|3)|3 = 3
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and
y∗1(·|2)|1 = (0, 4) y
∗2
(·|2)|1 = (4, 0)
y∗1(·|3)|1 = 2 y
∗2
(·|3)|1 = 2
y∗1(·|3)|2 = 2 y
∗2
(·|3)|2 = 2.
It can be verified that (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) is a na¨ıve complete equilibrium. In periods 1 and
2, expected relative prices of the good in period 3 in terms of the good in period 4 is 1 and
in period 3 this same relative price rises to 3. Thus, households have incorrect expectations
about prices.
Consider the case with sequentially complete markets. A na¨ıve SC equilibrium with
the same actual consumption does not exist. If household 1 would like to consume 2 units
both in period 1 and in period 2, then that household would not buy or sell any assets in
period 1 or period 2. Then, in period 3, starting with the initial endowments of 2 units of
the good in each period, the only resulting equilibrium from then on is to consume these
initial endowments. Thus, there are na¨ıve complete equilibria that are not allocationally
equivalent to any na¨ıve SC equilibrium. 2
We already mentioned that there is no relation between AD equilibria on the one hand
and na¨ıve (sophisticated) SC or na¨ıve (sophisticated) complete equilibria on the other
hand when preferences are not time-consistent. Theorem 5.8 shows that every na¨ıve SC
equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some complete equilibrium and Example 5.9
shows that the converse is not true. When we consider sophisticated behavior, however,
sophisticated SC equilibria are allocationally equivalent to sophisticated complete equilibria
and vice versa. This is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.10 Let the economy E be locally non-satiated. Every sophisticated SC equilib-
rium of E is allocationally equivalent to some sophisticated complete equilibrium of E and
vice versa.
Proof
Step 1
Consider p ∈ P, q ∈ Q, q ∈ Q, and, for every s, σ, for every τ, t with τ ≥ t and σ(t) = s(t),
µσ(τ)|s(t) ∈ R such that
ps(τ),T |s(t) = p·|s(τ),
qσ(τ)|s(t) = µσ(τ)|s(t)pσ(τ)|s(t)
q(σ(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|s(t) = µσ(τ)|s(t)(pσ(τ)|s(t), q(·|σ(τ))|s(t)),
pσ(τ)|s(t) 6= 0.
For every s(τ), for every yh·|s(τ−1) ∈ Y
h
·|s(τ−1), for every y
h
·|s(τ−1) ∈ Y
h
·|s(τ−1), we will prove
that whenever household h starts with the same income in both market structures, i.e.
ps(τ)|s(τ)y
h
(s(τ)|s(τ−1))|s(τ−1) +
∑
σ(τ+1)∈s+(τ)
q(σ(τ+1),T |s(τ))|s(τ)y
h
(σ(τ+1),T |s(τ−1))|s(τ−1) =
ps(τ)|s(τ)y
h
s(τ)|s(τ−1) + q·|s(τ)e
h
τ+1,T |s(τ),
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we have that:
(xh·|s(τ), y
h
·|s(τ)) ∈
sγhs(τ)(p·|s(τ), q·|s(τ), y
h
(·|s(τ−1))|s(τ−1))
implies that there is yh·|s(τ) ∈ Y
h
·|s(τ) such that
(xh·|s(τ), y
h
·|s(τ)) ∈
sγhs(τ)(p·|s(τ), q·|s(τ), y
h
s(τ)|s(τ−1), e
h
τ+1,T |s(τ))
and vice versa. We give a proof by induction.
[Step 1a]
First of all, it is obvious that for every yhs(T )|s(T−1), y
h
s(T )|s(T−1) with
p·|s(T )y
h
s(T )|s(T−1) = p·|s(T )y
h
s(T )|s(T−1)
it holds that
sγhs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
s(T )|s(T−1)) =
sγhs(T )(p·|s(T ), y
h
s(T )|s(T−1)).
[Step 1b]
Assume the result is true for every s(τ), where τ > t.
Now assume that, in state s(t), household h starts with the same income in both market
structures, i.e.
ps(t)|s(t)y
h
(s(t)|s(t−1))|s(t−1) +
∑
σ(t+1)∈s+(t)
q(σ(t+1),T |s(t))|s(t)y
h
(σ(t+1),T |s(t−1))|s(t−1) =
ps(t)|s(t)y
h
s(t)|s(t−1) + q·|s(t)e
h
t+1,T |s(t).
We first prove one direction of our result.
(⇒) Let
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
(·|s(t−1))|s(t−1)).
We define yh·|s(t) recursively as follows. For every σ(τ), s(t) there is a lσ(τ)|s(t) with pσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t) 6=
0. Start by setting, for every h ∈ H,
yhσ(T ),lσ(T )|s(t)|s(t) =
pσ(T )|s(t)
(
xhσ(T )|s(t) − e
h
σ(T )|s(t)
)
pσ(T ),lσ(T )|s(t)|s(t)
+ ehσ(T ),lσ(T )|s(t)|s(t),
and yhσ(T ),l|s(t) = e
h
σ(T ),l|s(t) for every l 6= lσ(T )|s(t). Then, continue by setting, for every h ∈ H,
t < τ < T, σ ∈ S with σ(t) = s(t),
yhσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t) =
pσ(τ)|s(t)
(
xhσ(τ)|s(t) − e
h
σ(τ)|s(t)
)
pσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
+ ehσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
+
∑
σ(τ+1)∈σ+(τ)
(
qσ(τ+1)|s(t)y
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t) − qσ(τ+1)|s(t)e
h
σ(τ+1)|s(t)
)
pσ(τ),lσ(τ)|s(t)|s(t)
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and y∗hσ(τ),l|s(t) = e
h
σ(τ),l|s(t) for every l 6= lσ(τ)|s(t).
Then,
ps(t+1)|s(t+1)y
h
s(t+1)|s(t) +
∑
σ(t+2)∈s+(t+1)
qσ(t+2),T |s(t)e
h
σ(t+2),T |s(t) =
ps(t+1)|s(t+1)x
h
s(t+1)|s(t) +
∑
σ(t+2)∈s+(t+1)
qσ(t+2),T |s(t)x
h
σ(t+2),T |s(t)
and
ps(t+1)|s(t+1)y
h
(s(t+1)|s(t))|s(t) +
∑
σ(t+2)∈s+(t+1)
q(σ(t+2),T |s(t+1))|s(t+1)y
h
(σ(t+2),T |s(t))|s(t) =
ps(t+1)|s(t+1)x
h
s(t+1)|s(t) +
∑
σ(t+2)∈s+(t+1)
q(σ(t+2),T |s(t+1))|s(t+1)x
h
σ(t+2),T |s(t)
so it follows that
ps(t+1)|s(t+1)y
h
(s(t+1)|s(t))|s(t) +
∑
σ(t+2)∈s+(t+1)
q(σ(t+2),T |s(t+1))|s(t+1)y
h
(σ(t+2),T |s(t))|s(t) =
ps(t+1)|s(t+1)y
h
s(t+1)|s(t) +
∑
σ(t+2)∈s+(t+1)
qσ(t+2),T |s(t)e
h
σ(t+2),T |s(t).
Using our induction hypothesis, we obtain easily that
(
xhs(t+1),T |s(t), y
h
s+(t+1),T |s(t)
)
∈ sδ
h
s(t+1)(ps(t+1),T |s(t), qs+(t+1),T |s(t), y
h
s(t+1)|s(t), e
h
t+2,T |s(t+1)).
Since the income of household h in state s(t) is the same under both market structures, it
follows that
(xh·|s(t), y
h
·|s(t)) ∈
sγhs(t)(p·|s(t), q·|s(t), y
h
s(t)|s(t−1), e
h
t+1,T |s(t)).
(⇐) The other direction of our result is straightforward, when following the approach
used in Theorem 5.8
Step 2
Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated SC equilibrium. By local non-satiation we know that
for all σ(τ), p∗σ(τ)|1 6= 0. By Theorem 4.4 there is µσ(τ)|1 ∈ R such that
q∗σ(τ)|1 = µσ(τ)|1p
∗
σ(τ)|1.
We define q ∈ Q as follows.
For every σ(T ),
q(σ(T ),T |σ(T−1))|1 = µσ(T )|1(p
∗
σ(T )|1).
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Next, recursively, for τ descending from T − 1 to 2, for every σ(τ),
q(σ(τ),T |σ(τ−1))|1 = µσ(τ)|1(p
∗
σ(τ)|1, q(·|σ(τ))|1).
Finally, for every s, σ, for every t, τ with τ ≥ t and σ(t) = s(t),
q(·|σ(τ))|s(t) = q(·|σ(τ))|1.
From the previous analysis it follows that there is a y such that (p∗, q, x∗, y) is a sophis-
ticated complete equilibrium.
Step 3
Let (p∗, q∗, x∗, y∗) be a sophisticated complete equilibrium. Consider any s, σ, any t, τ with
τ ≥ t and σ(t) = s(t). By local non-satiation we know that p∗σ(τ)|s(t) 6= 0. We define
qσ(τ)|s(t) = q
∗
(σ(τ)|σ(τ−1))|s(t).
From the previous analysis it follows that there is y ∈ Y such that (p∗, q, x∗, y) is a sophis-
ticated SC equilibrium. Q.E.D.
6 Conclusion
Arrow (1953) showed that every Pareto optimal allocation in an Arrow-Debreu economy
can be achieved both by Arrow-Debreu markets and a particular sequentially complete
market setting where first securities are traded and then spot markets are opened. Debreu
(1959) claims that, when all contingent commodities can be traded in the first period and
preferences of households do not change over time, there is no need for markets to reopen
in later periods.
In this paper we allow preferences to be time-inconsistent and we consider three market
structures. In this richer environment, we reconsider the results of Arrow (1953) and
Debreu (1959).
We first consider the Arrow-Debreu setting where all contingent commodities can be
traded in the first period and where markets are not reopened in later periods. Next, we
consider sequentially complete markets where goods on the spot markets and all one-period
ahead contingent commodities can be traded in every state. Finally, we consider complete
markets where all contingent commodities can be traded in every state.
Following Pollak (1968) we make a distinction between na¨ıve and sophisticated be-
havior. Na¨ıve households do not realize that their preferences change over time, whereas
sophisticated ones do. The latter will only make plans that they expect to carry out in the
future.
For sophisticated households, we show that sequentially complete markets are alloca-
tionally equivalent to complete markets. For na¨ıve households, every na¨ıve sequentially
complete equilibrium is allocationally equivalent to some na¨ıve complete equilibrium, but
the converse does not hold, even if we assume that preferences are time-consistent.
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When preferences are time-consistent and households are na¨ıve, every equilibrium in
the Arrow-Debreu setting is allocationally equivalent to some na¨ıve sequentially complete
equilibrium and to some na¨ıve complete equilibrium. When preferences are time-consistent
and, in addition, households are sophisticated all three market market structures are allo-
cationally equivalent.
Sophisticated behavior requires a lot from households, however. A more reasonable type
of behavior would be “somewhat” sophisticated. Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
(2003) assume that households do make plans that they expect to stick to. However,
they assume that households mispredict their future utility function and thus will want
to reconsider their plans in the future. Here, we could model these households as having
the same budget constraints as sophisticated households, but with different actual utility
functions in later periods. For these households, it cannot be expected that they have
perfect foresight of prices and thus, the results for the na¨ıve households in this paper would
apply. As soon as we allow at least one household not to be completely sophisticated, our
paper shows that the degree of completeness matters.
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